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Abstract
This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency
enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win
re-election. We show that, when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency
policy can be an effective signaling device. It is also shown that electoral pressure can
have a non-monotonic effect on transparency, but a higher electoral pressure always
increases the informativeness of signaling and the voter’s utility.
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1. Introduction
Enhancing fiscal transparency has been a central part of the attempts to reform public
sector governance in many countries since the late 1990s. The debate over the importance
of transparency is not limited to the policy circles, but it has attracted increasing interest
of academic researchers.1 Even though most of the researches support the benefit of fiscal
transparency, it is not obvious whether an office motivated politician has an incentive to
enhance transparency. As noted by Alesina and Perotti (1996), politicians benefit from lack
of transparency because it helps to create confusion and ambiguity on the real state of public
finance. Moreover, fiscal transparency is costly for politicians since it forces them to restrain
unproductive spending that favors themselves.
∗We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the associate editor for helpful suggestions. We are
grateful to Christophe Chamley, Guido Friebel, Stefan Gerlach, Marco LiCalzi, Barton Lipman, and Sigrid
Röhrs for helpful comments on previous versions of the paper. All remaining errors are our own. The views
expressed here are solely those of the authors.
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1See Ferejohn (1999), Milesi-Ferretti (2004), Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009, 2011) and Prat (2005) for a
theoretical analysis; Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b), Alt et al. (2002 and 2006) for an empirical investigation
of the beneficial effects of transparency.
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One benefit of fiscal transparency for politicians is to enhance their credibility by mak-
ing them accountable and self-disciplined. However, it is not clear whether this can be a
sufficient incentive. In fact, to resolve a fiscal problem, a politician needs to have an abil-
ity to mange spending in addition to be accountable and self-disciplined. In other words,
even if an incumbent enhances transparency, he would not be reelected if voters think that
the incumbent has a poor budgetary management ability. Then, the incumbent with a low
management ability might have no incentive to introduce the costly transparency policy as
Alesina and Perotti (1996) claim. On the other hand, the incumbent who has confidence to
manage fiscal problems, might introduce the costly transparency policy to signal his bud-
getary management ability. This paper analyzes whether an enhancement of transparency
on public spending could be explained by a politician’s intention to signal his budgetary
management ability in order to win re-election.
To investigate our question, we study the following signaling model. There is an incum-
bent who wishes to be reelected. Each candidate is characterized by two elements. The
first is his budgetary management ability which is the candidate’s private information. A
politician with a higher budgetary management ability is able to spend less to provide the
public services that voters expect. The second element is the other political abilities, a di-
verse set of complementary political abilities such as mediation. Voters have different tastes
over two abilities and each voter’s taste is characterized by a parameter which measures the
importance of the budgetary management ability relative to other ability. Thus, the distri-
bution of tastes reflects the importance of fiscal problems given the state of the economy.
The model consists of two periods. In the first period, the incumbent has to decide whether
to introduce the transparency policy that credibly commits the disclosure of spending at the
beginning of the next period. The transparency policy is costly for him since it restrains
unproductive spending that only benefits him. The level of spending depends not only on
the incumbent’s budgetary management ability, but also on unobservable economic shocks.
Thus, the incumbent cannot prove his budgetary management ability by simply disclosing
public spending. We then model public spending as a random variable which is correlated
with his budgetary management ability. In the second period, after observing the incum-
bent’s policy choice and spending (if it is disclosed), each voter updates her belief about the
incumbent’s budgetary management ability and casts her vote for either the incumbent or
the challenger. The incumbent wins if he gets the majority of the votes.
First, we analyze the condition under which the transparency policy can be an effective
signaling device, i.e., the existence of an “informative equilibrium.” We show that a high
level of electoral pressure is the key determinant to make the transparency policy an effec-
tive signaling device. Suppose the incumbent with a high budgetary management ability
introduces the transparency policy. When the incumbent faces an unpopular challenger, the
incumbent with a low ability has an incentive to imitate the high type by taking advantage
of the noisiness of the spending level. On the other hand, when the incumbent faces a pop-
ular challenger, the incumbent can win the election only when the disclosed spending level
impresses voters. Thus, the incumbent with a low ability has no incentive to introduce the
costly policy by imitating the high ability type.
Our main interest is to analyze how higher electoral pressure, i.e., the presence of a
more popular challenger, affects the probability to enhance transparency and the equilibrium
payoff of voters. First, when we focus on the informative equilibrium, higher level of electoral
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pressure decreases the probability to enhance transparency in the informative equilibrium.
Intuitively, when the incumbent faces a more popular challenger, the incumbent needs to have
a higher budgetary management ability to justify the cost of disclosure. Second, the effect
on the median voter’s payoff is somewhat counter-intuitive: even though higher electoral
pressure decreases the probability to enhance transparency, it increases the median voter’s
payoff in the informative equilibrium. The basic idea is the following. Higher electoral
pressure reduces the probability to enhance transparency by discouraging the incumbent
whose ability is lower than the challenger. Consequently, the policy choice becomes a more
informative signaling about the ability when the challenger is more popular.
The comparative statics focuses on the informative equilibrium but it can fail to exist
under a weak electoral pressure. On the other hand, since the N-pooling equilibrium always
exists, we need to deal with the equilibrium selection to understand the general effect of
electoral pressure. Since the disclosure cost is independent of the type and “dominance based
refinements” are not effective, we employ perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE) by Grossman
and Perry (1986). It is shown that when the spending level is sufficiently sensitive to an
exogenous economic shock, PSE provides a unique prediction given any level of electoral
pressure. Concretely, when the challenger is less popular than the incumbent, the N-pooling
equilibrium is the only PSE. On the other hand, when the challenger becomes more popular
than the incumbent, the informative equilibrium is the only PSE whenever it exists. In other
words, the probability that the incumbent enhances transparency in PSE is non-monotonic
in the electoral pressure: the probability is zero when the electoral pressure is low, whereas
the probability jumps to a strictly positive level when the pressure reaches a certain level. On
the other hand, the probability decreases if the challenger becomes even more popular. Note
that since the N-pooling equilibrium reveals no information, this is the worst equilibrium for
voters. Thus, from the result of the earlier comparative statics, a higher electoral pressure
always increases the median voter’s expected payoff despite that the effect of higher electoral
pressure on transparency is non-monotonic.
1.1. Related Literature
In most existing theoretical studies, (fiscal) transparency is an exogenous structure and the
analysis focuses on how it influences economic activities and welfare. For example, Milesi-
Ferretti (2004) shows that, with a lack of transparency, fiscal rules can lead to creative
accounting. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) analyze a model of electoral competition in which
transfer policies are imperfectly observable, and compare the equilibrium outcomes under
different transparency structures. They show that transparency of spending is beneficial,
while transparency of revenues can be harmful because it leads to an increase of wasteful
spending. Prat (2005) shows that transparency of “outcome” is always beneficial to voters
because it induces the politician to use information efficiently. However, transparency of
“action” can be detrimental because it induces the politician to behave in a conformist manner
and to disregard useful private information. Thus, one common message of these papers is
that transparency of outcome or spending is always desirable. Our paper studies whether the
incumbent has an incentive to introduce such a socially desirable fiscal transparency. Thus,
we treat disclosure on public spending as a strategic variable chosen by an office motivated
politician and analyze whether equilibria exist in which the politician enhances transparency
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in a simple election game.
Ferejohn (1999) is the only paper, to our knowledge, that treats the level of transparency
as an endogenous variable. He formulates the problem as moral hazard and shows that voters
induce an office-motivated politician to take more “transparent” actions. On the other hand,
we formulate the problem as adverse selection and explain the enhancement of transparency
as a signaling equilibrium. In our model, unlike the “uniform” prediction of Ferejohn (1999),
whether an office-motivated politician enhances transparency depends on many factors such
as the electoral competitive pressure, and the degree of public interest in fiscal issues.
The idea that voters learn the incumbent’s ability from a fiscal variable is similar to
Beviá and Llavador (2009). However, since their purpose is to analyze the pure effect of the
incumbent’s informational advantage, they focus on the case in which the incumbent always
discloses the fiscal variable. On the contrary, since the purpose of the current paper is to
analyze how electoral pressure can affect fiscal transparency and voters’ welfare, we treat the
incumbent’s disclosure decision as a strategic variable.2
From a game theoretical perspective, this paper belongs to the literature on signaling
games. In particular, since the sender chooses whether to disclose private information, the
game shares some character with persuasion games by Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981).
However, our model departs from the standard persuasion game in two aspects. First, the
sender can disclose a private signal which is correlated with his private information, while the
private information itself cannot be disclosed. Second, the sender has to make a disclosure
decision before the realization of information. Since the cost of disclosure plays an important
role, the model also has an aspect of Spencian signaling game. Unlike the standard costly
signaling model, the cost function is independent of the type in our model. However, since the
stochastic “performance” is correlated with the sender’s type, our model can be interpreted
as a costly signaling game in the interim stage, i.e., after observing the type but before
observing the performance.3
The cost of disclosure plays a crucial role in our signaling model. The effect of “costly dis-
closure” is also studied in different contexts. For example, in accounting/corporate finance
literature, Verrecchia (1983) studies how the cost of disclosure affects the firm’s decision
to release private information. In industrial organization, there are also some papers that
study how firms communicate the product quality when disclosure is costly, e.g., Jovanovic
(1982), Daughety and Reinganum (2008). The effect of the disclosure cost on the equilibrium
strategy is analogous to these papers. Unlike in costless disclosure models, the sender could
conceal information in equilibrium since the receiver knows that the benefit from disclosure
needs to be sufficiently high to cover the cost. Consequently, the ex ante probability of con-
cealing information is positive in the costly disclosure models. Even though the equilibrium
property of our model is similar to these models, the main result of this paper, i.e., the effect
of electoral pressure on transparency, is unique to our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Section 3
analyzes the equilibria; Section 4 provides comparative statics of the informative equilibrium;
the set of equilibria is refined in Section 5; Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7
concludes.
2We would like to thank the associate editor for this suggestion.
3We appreciate a referee for pointing this out.
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2. Model
The model consists of two periods. There is a continuum of voters who have to choose
between two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, in an election scheduled for the
second period. The election is based on majority rule.
Each candidate is characterized by his budgetary management ability θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1],
which is private information, and his political ability ω ∈ [0, 1], which is observable for the
sake of the analysis.4 In the model, his budgetary management ability θ refers to the ability
of managing public spending efficiently, while his political skill ω refers to a diverse set of
complementary political abilities such as mediation, both in domestic and foreign affairs.
In the first period, the incumbent has to decide whether to introduce a transparency
policy to disclose public spending s ∈ S = [0,∞), which is not realized yet. After the
policy choice, the spending level is determined by his budgetary management ability and
unobservable economic shocks. Concretely, suppose that Nature draws s given θ according
to the conditional probability density f(s|θ) where suppf(.|θ) = S for any θ.5 We assume




f(s|θ′) is strictly decreasing in s ∈ S for any θ′ < θ′′.
Intuitively, this assumption states that with a higher level of spending, it is more likely
that the budgetary management ability is low. As in other models of information economics,
this assumption restricts our attention to “monotonic environments” and helps us to provide
clear insights to the problem. Note that f(s, θ) reflects the state of the economy in period 1.
For example, during a recession, the level of spending in social programs might need to be
increased in order to manage the economy. Thus, the level of spending s could be high even
if the incumbent has a high budgetary management ability. Hence, when the economy is in
a recession, f(s|θ) may have a high value for a large s even if θ is high. On the other hand,
during booms it might be easier to manage the economy with lower spending even if the
incumbent has a low budgetary management ability. Thus, when the economy is booming,
f(s|θ) may have a low value for high s even if θ is low.
If the incumbent introduces the transparency policy, i.e., a = Y , spending s will be
disclosed in the next period, while he incurs the cost c ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, if he
does not introduce the policy in period 1, a = N , he incurs no cost and public spending
cannot be disclosed next period. We assume that the incumbent can credibly commit to the
announced transparency policy.
As we explained in the literature review, the cost of the transparency policy plays a
crucial role in our model. There are two interpretations of the cost. First, transparency
forces the incumbent to restrain unproductive spending that only benefits himself or his
political party. That is, the cost can be interpreted as a reduced “political rent.” Hence,
in societies in which politicians enjoy personal benefits from their position, the level of c is
4The results of this paper are preserved even if ω is private inforamtion as long as there is no effective
signaling device for ω.
5The setting can be justified by the standard logic in producer theory. Suppose that the government tries
to provide public service that satisfies voters, while minimizing the expenditure. Then, the spending level
reflects the incumbent’s budgetary management ability.
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very high, while in societies in which politicians are committed to the common good, the
cost might be relatively low. Another interpretation of c is the set-up and implementation
costs of the policy. In order to introduce a transparency policy, the incumbent might need
to build a system and employ workers who organize and disseminate information.6
In period 2, voters evaluate the incumbent’s budgetary management ability θ based on
the level of spending s whenever it is available. However, since public spending s depends
not only on the ability θ, but also on some unobservable economic and political shocks,
voters cannot pin down the budgetary management ability only from observing spending s.
Thus, based on the updated belief conditional on a policy choice and disclosed information
(if available), each voter makes a decision.
Turning to the payoff functions, the incumbent is office motivated and his payoff depends
on the outcome of the election and his policy choice. Let c(a) be the cost of his policy choice
a, that is, c(Y ) = c and c(N) = 0. Then, the incumbent’s payoff from a is 1 − c(a) if he is
re-elected, while his payoff is −c(a) if he loses the election. Each voter’s payoff from electing
a candidate is a linear combination of the elected politician’s budgetary management ability
θ and his political ability ω with relative weights α and (1− α) respectively.7 Hence, given
(θ, ω), a voter’s payoff from selecting a candidate is αθ + (1 − α)ω where α ∈ [0, 1]. α is
a taste parameter which characterizes each voter’s preference for a politician’s budgetary
management skill. Thus, a voter characterized by a higher α cares more about the efficiency
in government spending than about the candidate’s political abilities. The median voter’s
α captures the economic/political environment. For example, the median α might be quite
high when the government suffers from a serious fiscal problem, whereas the median α could
be small in good economic conditions.
Finally, we clarify the timeline of our game and define the strategies. In period 1, the
incumbent chooses his action a that is either Y or N . In period 2, if the incumbent chooses
a = Y in period 1, voters observe public spending s, while s cannot be observed if the
incumbent chooses a = N . Each voter then chooses whether to vote for the incumbent “I”
or the challenger “C” given available information. Thus, the incumbent’s strategy8 is defined
as a mapping σ : Θ → A. On the other hand, the voter’s strategy is defined as a mapping
r : (A × Z)\{(Y,∅)} → {I, C} where Z = S ∪ {∅} is disclosed information and ∅ denotes
“no available information.”9 For simplicity, we assume that the challenger has no effective
signaling device and no effective action to take. It is assumed that the expected value of the
challenger’s budgetary management ability, θ0 ∈ (0, 1), and his political ability, ω0 ∈ (0, 1),
are both common knowledge between the incumbent and voters. Thus, essentially, our
model is a signaling game between the incumbent and voters. We employ perfect Bayesian
equilibrium to analyze the game.
6For example, the Congressional Budget Office in US estimated that the cost of the implementation of
the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act would be around $20 million over the 2007-2011
period.
7We can interpret the voter’s payoff as her future consumption given the politicians’ abilities. Then α
could depend on her belief about the effect of the politician’s budgetary management ability on her future
consumption.
8We focus on pure strategies since the set of types which use a mixed strategy in any equilibrium is
measure zero.




Since this is a two-stage game, we start with each voter’s optimal decision given a strategy
and available information. The difference between a voter’s expected payoff from electing
the incumbent and that from electing the challenger conditional on (a, z) is
α(E[θ|a, z]− θ0) + (1− α)(ω − ω0). (1)
If E[θ|a, z] − θ0 > ω − ω0, then, whenever a voter with α prefers the incumbent to
the challenger, a voter with α′ > α also prefers the incumbent. On the other hand, if
E[θ|a, z]−θ0 < ω−ω0, then, whenever a voter with α prefers the challenger to the incumbent,
a voter with α′ > α also prefers the challenger. Then, since the preferences are order-
restricted, the median voter determines the outcome of the election. Let α∗ be α of the
median voter.
When the median voter observes the incumbent’s choice a and disclosed information z,
she updates her belief about the incumbent’s ability. Concretely, let Θσ(a) = {θ : σ(θ) = a}.
Then, when the incumbent uses strategy σ and his action a is such that Θσ(a) 6= ∅, the





′,s)dθ′ if θ ∈ Θσ(a)and z = s
fθ(θ)´
θ′∈Θσ(a) fθ(θ
′)dθ′ if θ ∈ Θσ(a)and z = ∅
0 if θ /∈ Θσ(a)
(2)
The median voter chooses a candidate whose expected value is higher. Let v(α∗, θ, ω) be
the payoff of the median voter from electing the incumbent, while v(α∗, θ0, ω0) be the payoff
of the median voter from electing the challenger. The median voter’s optimal reaction is
then









∗, θ, ω)µ(θ|a, z;σ)dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0) . (3)
From the strict monotone likelihood ratio property, i.e., Assumption 1, the optimal voting
rule can be characterized by cutoff signal s(α∗, σ) ∈ [0,∞) such that10
{
r(Y, s;α∗, σ) = I if s < s(α∗, σ)
r(Y, s;α∗, σ) = C if s > s(α∗, σ) . (4)
Turning to the incumbent’s problem, given σ, we can compute the probability of re-
10If the voter chooses C for any s, then s(α∗, σ) =∞. If the voter chooses I for any s, s(α∗, σ) = 0.
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election conditional on (a, θ) as follows
Qa(θ;σ) =

F (s(α∗, σ)|θ) if a = Y
1 if a = N and
´
θ∈Θσ(N) v(α
∗, θ, ω)µ(θ|N,∅;σ)dθ ≥ v(α∗, θ0, ω0)
0 if a = N and
´
θ∈Θσ(N) v(α
∗, θ, ω)µ(θ|N,∅;σ)dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0)
(5)
where F (s|θ) is the cumulative distribution of f(s|θ).
Thus, type θ incumbent’s expected payoff from a given σ is{
QY (θ;σ)− c if a = Y
QN(θ;σ) if a = N
. (6)
3.2. Characterization of Equilibria
Our signaling game can have both pooling and informative equilibria. In a pooling equilib-
rium, the incumbent’s action is constant in θ and voters have to make their decision based
only on disclosed information. On the other hand, in an informative equilibrium, the incum-
bent’s policy choice depends on θ. Thus, voters can learn about θ not only from the disclosed
information but also from the policy choice. We then analyze under which circumstances
the transparency policy can be an effective signaling device.
3.2.1. Pooling Equilibria
Since there are two possible actions for the incumbent, there are two kinds of pooling strate-
gies. A pooling strategy is Y-pooling if all types choose Y , while a pooling strategy is
N-pooling if all types choose N . Note that in every pooling equilibrium, the policy choice
does not reveal any information. In the Y-pooling equilibrium, public spending s is the only
available information about θ. On the other hand, in the N-pooling equilibrium voters have
to make a decision based only on their priors.
First, it is easy to see that the N-pooling equilibrium always exists when voters interpret
off-equilibrium action Y as a “negative signal” about θ. Second, the Y-pooling equilibrium
exists if and only if c ≤ F (s(α∗, σp)|0), where σp is the Y-pooling strategy. Observe that
type θ incumbent’s expected payoff from Y given the Y-pooling strategy is F (s(α∗, σp)|θ)−c.
When the expected payoff is positive for the worst type, i.e., θ = 0, and voters interpret off-
equilibrium action N as a “negative signal” about θ, no type has incentive to deviate from
Y . Since off-equilibrium beliefs of pooling equilibria do not seem always “reasonable,” we
refine pooling equilibria in Section 5.
3.2.2. Informative Equilibria
When an equilibrium strategy is informative, voters can learn about the incumbent’s ability
θ not only from the level of spending s, but also from the incumbent’s action a. Since voters
can make decisions based on additional information, voters’ ex ante expected payoffs in an
informative equilibrium are always higher than in any pooling equilibrium.
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First, we introduce a class of strategies which plays a key role in our paper. An incum-
bent’s strategy is a cutoff strategy if there exists θˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that whenever θ > θˆ, the
incumbent chooses Y, while whenever θ < θˆ, the incumbent chooses N. An equilibrium is a
cutoff equilibrium if the incumbent uses a cutoff strategy in the equilibrium.
The first lemma states that, in any equilibrium, the incumbent introduces the trans-
parency policy whenever a lower type incumbent introduces the policy.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium is a cutoff equilibrium.11
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition of the result is as follows. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which
a higher type chooses N, while a lower type chooses Y. Note that by Assumption 1, the
expected payoff from Y is higher for the higher type. However, since the expected payoff
from N is constant in the type, the higher type always has an incentive to choose Y.
The next lemma provides another property of informative equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In any informative equilibrium, the incumbent’s expected payoff from N is 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, if the incumbent does not disclose spending, there is no stochastic element in
his payoff. Thus the outcome has to be either “win” or “lose” for sure. If he can win with
certainty without disclosure, every type prefers not to disclose spending. Hence, whenever
the incumbent does not disclose in an informative equilibrium, the probability of winning
has to be zero.









This lemma says that the majority of voters have to be sufficiently interested in fiscal
issues in order to have an informative equilibrium. This result is straightforward: when
the incumbent cannot win the election even if the median voter believes he has the highest
possible θ, he never uses the expensive transparency policy in equilibrium. On the other
hand, when the incumbent can win even if the median voter believes that he has the lowest
budgetary management ability, he has no reason to enhance transparency.
To state the next lemma, let θ(α∗, θ0, ω0) = θ0 + 1−α
∗
α∗ (ω0 − ω). Intuitively, suppose
the median voter can observe θ. Then, the voter chooses the incumbent (challenger) if
θ > (<)θ(α∗, θ0, ω0).
Lemma 4. Suppose α∗ satisfies the inequality of Lemma 3. Then, the equilibrium cutoff
type in any informative equilibrium is strictly lower than θ(α∗, θ0, ω0).
11Note that a pooling strategy is a cutoff strategy whose cutoff type is 0 or ∞.
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Proof. See appendix.
To see the idea of Lemma 4, observe that if the incumbent uses a cutoff strategy in which
the cutoff type is higher or equal to θ(α∗, θ0, ω0), Y reveals that his type is at least as good
as θ(α∗, θ0, ω0). Then, by the definition of θ(α∗, θ0, ω0), the voter chooses the incumbent with
probability 1 irrespective of the level of spending s. Then, a lower type has an incentive to
imitate higher types.
Now we are ready to characterize the economic environment under which the transparency
policy can be an effective signaling device.








(i) There exists an informative equilibrium if and only if c ∈ (F (s(α∗, σp)|0), 1).
(ii) Whenever an informative equilibrium exists, there exists a unique informative equi-
librium.
Proof. See appendix.
Recall the Y-pooling equilibrium exists if and only if F (s(α∗, σp)|0) ≥ c. Hence, an
informative equilibrium exists only if there is no Y-pooling equilibrium. The intuition is
that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, only high types, who are confident
about their future performance s, can introduce the costly transparency policy. Low types,
expecting a poor future performance, avoid the commitment to disclose s.
Proposition 1 is rather straightforward but there are a couple of insightful implications.
To state these implications, we define a new term. Candidate A is more popular than B
if the majority of voters prefer candidate A to B in period 1. Concretely, the incumbent is
more (less) popular than the challenger if
ˆ
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ > (<)v(α∗, θ0, ω0). (7)
To state the first one, let v0 = v(α∗, θ0, ω0) be the median voter’s payoff from selecting the
challenger. The following corollary of Proposition 1-(i) states that an informative equilibrium
exists under a reasonably strong “electoral pressure.”
Corollary 1. If v0 is smaller than α∗ + (1 − α∗)ω but sufficiently close to α∗ + (1 − α∗)ω,
there exists an informative equilibrium.
The spending level has to be sufficiently low to win the election given the Y-pooling
strategy. Thus, by choosing a large v0, we can make F (s(α∗, σp)|0) strictly lower than c.
Observe if v0 > α∗ + (1 − α∗)ω, then α∗ < ω0−ωω0−ω+1−θ0 and, from Lemma 3, no informative
equilibrium exists.





{Eθ[θ]− Eθ[θ|s]}dF (s|θ = 0). (8)
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Intuitively, suppose that the incumbent discloses s following the Y-pooling strategy. Even
if the incumbent is the worst type, the expected difference between the unconditional mean
of θ and the conditional mean of θ given s should be small if s is noisy. Thus, ρ is small if s
is noisy.12
Corollary 2. If ρ is sufficiently small, an informative equilibrium exists only if the challenger
is more popular than the incumbent.
Note that if the incumbent uses Y-pooling strategy, noisier s changes the voter’s posterior
belief about θ only in a smaller degree. Thus, if the incumbent is more popular than the
challenger, the voter selects the incumbent even if s is high, that is, F (s(α∗, σp)|0) is large.
Thus, if ρ is sufficiently small, F (s(α∗, σp)|0) > c. On the other hand, if the challenger is
more popular than the incumbent, the voter selects the challenger unless s is sufficiently low,
that is, F (s(α∗, σp)|0) is small. Thus, if ρ is sufficiently small, F (s(α∗, σp)|0) < c.
To provide intuition, observe that when the incumbent is less popular, he has to impress
voters to win the election. However, if s is very noisy, even the highest ability type loses the
election with a high probability if all types introduce the transparency. Thus, in equilibrium,
only some high types introduce the costly transparency. On the other hand, when the
incumbent is more popular than the challenger, he can win the election unless he hurts his
popularity to a great extent. In fact, when some high types introduce the costly transparency
policy, low types can take advantage of the noisiness of s and the popularity by imitating
high types.
4. Comparative statics
This section provides comparative statics of the informative equilibrium. Concretely, we
analyze how a higher electoral competition affects (i) the probability to enhance transparency
and (ii) the median voter’s equilibrium payoff. Let v0 := v(α∗, θ0, ω0).
Proposition 2. Suppose there exists an informative equilibrium under each v0 and v′0 where
v′0 > v0.
(i) The ex ante probability of adopting the transparency policy under v0 is higher than
that under v′0.
(ii) The median voter’s equilibrium payoff under v′0 is higher than that under v0.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 says that more competition reduces the ex ante probability of adopting the
transparency policy, while it increases the median voter’s payoff. The effect of competition
on the probability of the policy adoption is rather straightforward. If the challenger is more
popular, the probability of winning with the signaling becomes lower given a strategy. Hence,
only higher types can justify the cost of the transparency policy as signaling. Hence, the
12There can be other ways to define the informativeness of s. However, since whether an informative
equilibrium exists or not depends on F (s|θ = 0) (see Proposition 1), this is a simple way to define relevant
“informativeness.”
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equilibrium cutoff becomes higher and the ex ante probability of the policy adoption gets
lower when the incumbent faces a more popular challenger.
At first glance, higher electoral pressure seems to decrease the voter’s payoff since it re-
duces the ex ante probability of disclosure. However, note that the voter obtains information
through two channels in our model: the spending level and the signaling, i.e., a policy choice.
Thus, the basic idea of Proposition 2-(ii) is that even though more competition decreases the
probability to disclose spending, it increases the informativeness of signaling and the positive
effect dominates the negative effect. An intuition for the result is as follows. As we showed
in Lemma 4, the equilibrium cutoff level is always smaller than the type that makes the
voter indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger. Hence, whenever the incumbent
chooses not to adopt the policy, it reveals that selecting the challenger is the optimal choice.
On the other hand, since the incumbent who introduces the policy is not always a better
candidate than the challenger, the voter’s choice depends on the realization of the spending
level when the incumbent adopts the policy. As a result, the voter could choose an inferior
candidate. Then, since a higher equilibrium cutoff level reduces the probability of the policy
adoption and of such a suboptimal voting decision, it increases the voter’s payoff.
Remark 1. The effect of higher c on the informative equilibrium is analogous to the
effect of higher electoral pressure. If c gets higher, the incumbent needs a higher budgetary
management ability to compensate the cost. Thus, the equilibrium cutoff type becomes
higher if the incumbent faces a higher cost. The higher cutoff decreases the probability of
adopting the transparency policy, whereas the signaling becomes more informative. The net
effect is then analogous to that in Proposition 2: higher cost increases the median voter’s
payoff as long as the cost is not too high to support an informative equilibrium.
5. Refinement
As we showed in the last section, our game has always two equilibria given parameters. If
there is no Y-pooling equilibrium, there exists the N-pooling and the informative equilibrium.
On the other hand, if there is the Y-pooling equilibrium, it always co-exists with the N-
pooling equilibrium. Thus, in order to provide a prediction about how electoral pressure
affects transparency, we need to refine the equilibria.
The key to refine equilibria is to check whether each pooling equilibrium is reasonable
since they often rely on counter-intuitive off-equilibrium beliefs. For instance, in the N-
pooling equilibrium, voters believe that the incumbent has a low budgetary management
ability when the transparency policy is introduced. On the other hand, in the Y-pooling
equilibrium, voters interpret “no disclosure” as a signal of incompetence even if the incumbent
has a good reputation about his budgetary management ability.
To eliminate “unreasonable” pooling equilibria, we employ perfect sequential equi-
librium (PSE) introduced by Grossman and Perry (1986). The essence of PSE is refining
perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) by restricting off-equilibrium beliefs to be “credible.” Con-
cretely, once a deviation has occurred, the voter tries to rationalize the deviation by trying
to find a set of types T ⊂ Θ that would benefit from the deviation if and only if he is be-
lieved to be in T . More precisely, suppose the incumbent chooses an off-equilibrium action.
Voters then try to find T ⊂ Θ such that, if voters choose the optimal action believing the
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incumbent’s type is in T , the set of types whose expected payoffs are strictly higher than
the equilibrium payoff is exactly T . If such T exists, the credible updating rule given





′,s)dθ′ if θ ∈ T and a = Y
fθ′ (θ)´
θ′∈T\Θ fθ′ (θ
′)dθ′ if θ ∈ T\Θand a = N
0 otherwise
(9)
Unlike PBE, PSE consists of “meta-strategies” and a credible updating rule.13 However, since
we already have perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) and it is known that any PSE-play is also
PBE-play, there is no benefit of constructing PSE with meta-strategies. Thus, in this paper,
we say a PBE (or equilibrium) is PSE if the incumbent has no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium strategy when the voter follows the credible updating rule for off-equilibrium
actions. Note that since there is no off-equilibrium action in informative equilibria, they are
always PSE.
The next result states that when the incumbent is less popular than the challenger in




v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0) and there exists an informative
equilibrium. Then, the informative equilibrium is the unique PSE.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that there is no Y-pooling equilibrium when an informative equilibrium exists.
Thus, to show Proposition 3, we need to prove that the N-pooling is not a PSE when the
incumbent is less popular than the challenger. To provide an intuition, suppose that the
incumbent has a bad reputation about his budgetary management ability. Then, in the
N-pooling equilibrium, when voters observe deviation Y , voters might interpret it as an
“attempt to demonstrate his budgetary management ability.” In other words, voters might
think that the incumbent that deviates could have a high budgetary management ability.
In fact, if the informative equilibrium with cutoff type θˆ∗ exists and voters believe that the
deviated incumbent belongs to the set [θˆ∗, 1], the incumbent has an incentive to deviate only
if his type belongs to the set [θˆ∗, 1]. That is, the deviation can credibly signal that his type
is higher than θˆ∗.
The next proposition states that when the incumbent is more popular than the challenger,




v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ > v(α∗, θ0, ω0). Then, any PSE is either the
N-pooling or an informative equilibrium. Moreover, if ρ is sufficiently small, the N-pooling
is the only PSE.
13In a meta-strategy, the voter must specify her action for each possible history and each possible belief. As
a result, if the incumbent plays an off-equilibrium action, the voter’s response is based on the meta-strategy
given a belief computed by the credible updating rule. That is, the combination of a meta-strategy and a
credible updating rule effectively restricts some off-equilibrium plays to be “reasonable.”
13
Proof. See appendix.
To see the result, suppose the incumbent deviates from the Y-pooling equilibrium. When
the incumbent has a good reputation about his budgetary management ability, voters might
think that the incumbent has nothing to prove and the purpose of the deviation is to save
the cost of the transparency policy. Note that if voters believe that the deviated incumbent
can be any type in Θ, all types have an incentive to deviate.
Based on our refinement, we can provide a sharper implication on how electoral pressure
effects transparency. In practice, the spending level seems quite sensitive to exogenous shocks
and tends to be a very noisy signal about θ, i.e., ρ is small. From Proposition 4, if ρ is small
and the incumbent is more popular than the challenger, the only PSE is the N-pooling. On
the other hand, from Proposition 3 and Corollary 2, the informative equilibrium is the unique
PSE if the challenger is more popular than the incumbent and ρ is sufficiently small. Then,
the effect of electoral pressure on transparency can be summarized as follows. Let P ∗(v0) be
the ex ante probability of adopting the transparency policy in PSE. That is,
P ∗(v0) =
{













Thus, P ∗(v0) is a non monotonic in v0: if the challenger becomes more popular than the
incumbent, it could dramatically enhance transparency as a jump from the N-pooling to
the informative equilibrium, whereas having even more popular challenger decreases the
probability to enhance transparency.
6. Discussion
6.1. Does political competition increase transparency?
In Section 5, we show that higher electoral pressure can have a non-monotonic effect: having
a challenger who is more popular than the incumbent enhances transparency, while having
an even more popular challenger reduces the probability of transparency enhancement. How-
ever, there is a caveat when we consider the empirical implication of this theoretical result.
Since having a challenger who is more popular than the incumbent induces a “jump” from
the N-pooling to an informative equilibria, while having an even more popular challenger
induces just a continuous change between informative equilibria, the first effect should be
empirically more pronounced. Thus, if the current level of transparency is a consequence of
the accumulation of the past transparency enhancements, the transparency level of a country
should be essentially determined by the number of past challengers who were more popular
than incumbents. As a result, the level of transparency of a country with a low level of
political competition should be lower than that of a country with a high level of political
competition in general.
This implication of our model is consistent with the empirical evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between political competition and fiscal transparency presented in Alt and Lassen
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(2006a), using a sample of 19 OECD countries, and in Alt et al. (2006), using data on Amer-
ican states. In their study, the level of political competition is measured as turnover. Since
a high v0 always increases the probability of turnover, their measure of political competition
is a good proxy of “electoral pressure” in our model.
6.2. Should transparency be rule-based?
It is tempting to impose transparency as a rule, believing it improves welfare. However, our
results suggest that rule-based transparency can be optimal only in some circumstances. In
fact, when transparency becomes a rule, voters receive the same level of information as in
the Y-pooling equilibrium. Instead, when the incumbent enhances transparency voluntarily,
voters obtain information not only from the disclosed reports (spending s), but also from
the signaling.
On the other hand, as our intuition suggests, “voluntary transparency” is not always
more desirable than “rule-based transparency.” In fact, our analysis suggests that whether
transparency should be rule based or not depends on the situation. When the challenger is
more popular than the incumbent, the informative equilibrium can be the only PSE. Thus,
voters can be better off by leaving the choice of the transparency policy to the incumbent.
On the other hand, when the incumbent is more popular than the challenger, the N-pooling
equilibrium can be the most reasonable prediction from Proposition 4. Consequently, voters
may be better off by rule-based transparency that guarantees disclosure.
6.3. Repeated elections
In order to focus on the basic idea, there is only one election in this model. Thus, the model
describes the incumbent’s problem at the end of the first term when the term limit of office
is two.14 On the other hand, our model also provides some insight into the case without
term limit.
To see the idea, suppose that our two-period model is repeated indefinitely. The incum-
bent, who discounts the future payoff, decides whether to disclose public spending just before
each election. The challenger is randomly drawn from a distribution in each period and the
game ends when a challenger defeats the incumbent. Even though there are multiple equilib-
ria,15 the most natural equilibrium has the following property: (i) the incumbent introduces
the transparency policy at some point and continues the policy in the later terms, (ii) the
voters interpret the discontinuation of the policy as a “negative signal.” Note that, in this
equilibrium, the continuation of the policy does not reveal new information as a signaling.
In other words, after introducing the policy, the only informative signal the incumbent can
send is the negative signal by the discontinuation of the policy.16
Even though the incumbent loses his “positive signaling device” after introducing the
policy, our model still provides an insight into the incumbent’s decision to introduce the
transparency policy. When we focus on the most natural equilibrium, the repeated setting
14For example, the term limit of the US president is two four-year terms. Some states in US have a limit
of two consecutive terms. France has a semi-presidential system with two five-year terms in office.
15Note that the N-pooling is always an equilibrium.
16We appreciate a referee for this insightful observation.
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only affects the level of the equilibrium cutoff type. Observe that the payoff from introducing
the policy needs to incorporate the benefit from future terms. Then, the equilibrium cutoff
type, who finds the payoff from disclosure is zero, should decrease since the stake becomes
higher. Consequently, under the repeated setting, the equilibrium signaling becomes less
informative analogous to the effect of lower c in our basic model.
7. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed how fiscal transparency can emerge in equilibrium when the in-
cumbent uses a costly transparency policy to signal his budgetary management ability to
win re-election. We show that the transparency policy can be an effective signaling device
when the majority of voters is sufficiently interested in fiscal issues and the incumbent faces
a sufficiently popular challenger. Electoral pressure can have a non-monotonic effect on the




This appendix provides the omitted mathematical proofs.
8.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which σ(θ′) = Y and σ(θ′′) = N for θ′ < θ′′. Then,
QY (θ
′;σ)− c ≥ QN(θ′;σ) and QY (θ′′;σ)− c ≤ QN(θ′′;σ). Note that QN(θ′;σ) = QN(θ′′;σ).
On the other hand, by Assumption 1, QY (θ′;σ) < QY (θ′′;σ). This contradicts the hypothesis.
8.2. Proof of Lemma 2
Note that given cutoff strategy σθˆ, N reveals that the incumbent’s type is lower than θˆ. The






v(α∗, θ, ω) fθ(θ)
Fθ(θˆ)




v(α∗, θ, ω) fθ(θ)
Fθ(θˆ)
dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0)
. (A1)
Thus, the expected payoff from N has to be either 0 or 1 in any informative equilib-
rium. Since any informative equilibrium is a cutoff equilibrium, given equilibrium cutoff θˆ∗,
QY (θ, σθˆ∗)−c > (<) QN(θ, σθˆ∗) for any θ > (<) θˆ∗. Then, since QY (θ, σθˆ) ≤ 1, the inequality
can be satisfied only if QN(θ, σθˆ∗) = 0.
8.3. Proof of Lemma 3
When the incumbent cannot win the election even if the median voters believe that θ = 1
with probability 1, then N is the dominant choice. Thus, we need
α∗ + (1− α∗)ω > α∗θ0 + (1− α∗)ω0, (A2)
or α∗ > ω0−ω
ω0−ω+1−θ0 . On the other hand, when the incumbent can win even if voters believe
that θ = 0 with probability 1, N is the dominant choice. Hence, we need
(1− α∗)ω < α∗θ0 + (1− α∗)ω0, (A3)
or α∗ > ω−ω0
ω−ω0+θ0 .
8.4. Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that the incumbent uses a cutoff strategy in which the cutoff type is higher or equal
to θ(α∗, θ0, ω0) in an equilibrium. Note that α∗θ(α∗, θ0, ω0) + (1−α∗)ω = α∗θ0 + (1−α∗)ω0.
Then, when the incumbent chooses Y, it perfectly reveals that his type is at least as good
as θ(α∗, θ0, ω0). As a result, the voter chooses the incumbent with probability 1 irrespective
of the level of spending s. However, then, θ < θ(α∗, θ0, ω0) has an incentive to choose Y
pretending his type is higher than θ(α∗, θ0, ω0). Thus, such an equilibrium never exists.
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8.5. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the following two cases.
Case 1 :
´
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0).
Note that, in this case, the voter’s payoff from selecting the incumbent conditional on N
is always lower than
´
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ. Thus, QN(θˆ;σθˆ) = 0 for any θˆ ∈ Θ. On the other
hand, note thatQY (θˆ;σθˆ) is strictly increasing in θˆ. Moreover, if α
∗ > ω0−ω
ω0−ω+1−θ0 , QY (θˆ;σθˆ) >
c for sufficiently large θˆ. Then, since QY (θˆ;σθˆ) is continuous and strictly increasing, there
exists a unique θˆ∗ such that F (s(α∗, σθˆ∗)|θˆ∗)−c = 0 if and only ifQY (0;σp) < c or equivalently
F (s(α∗, σp)|0) < c where σp is the Y-pooling strategy.
To show that the cutoff strategy with θˆ∗, denoted by σθˆ∗ , is an equilibrium strategy,
note that by Assumption 1, QY (θ;σθˆ∗)− c−QN(θ;σθˆ∗) is strictly increasing in θ given the
strategy. Thus, given the strategy, any θ has no incentive to deviate. From Lemma 1, since
any informative equilibrium is a cutoff equilibrium, this is the only informative equilibrium.
Case 2 :
´
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ > v(α∗, θ0, ω0)
Let θ˜ be θ′ such that
´
θ<θ′ v(α
∗, θ, ω) fθ(θ)
Fθ(θ′)
dθ = v(α∗, θ0, ω0). Obviously, θ˜ exists in Case
2 and α∗ > ω−ω0
ω−ω0+θ0 . Then, by construction of θ˜, QN(θˆ;σθˆ) = 0 if θˆ ≤ θ˜, while QN(θˆ;σθˆ) = 1
if θˆ > θ˜. Moreover, observe that, from the definition of θ˜ and v(α∗, θ, ω) is increasing in θ,
clearly v(α∗, θ˜, ω) > v(α∗, θ0, ω0). Thus, when the voter observes Y given the cutoff strategy
with θ˜, it reveals that θ > θ˜, thus QY (θ˜;σθ˜) = 1. Moreover, QY (θˆ;σθˆ) = F (s(α
∗, σp)|0) at
θˆ = 0. Since QY (θˆ, σθˆ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θˆ and c ∈ (0, 1), there exists
a unique θˆ′ < θ˜ such that QY (θˆ′, σθˆ′) − c = QN(θˆ′, σθˆ′) = 0 if and only if QY (0;σp) < c or
equivalently F (s(α∗, σp)|0) < c.
Now, we claim that the cutoff strategy with θˆ′ is an equilibrium strategy. Note that
QY (θ, σθˆ′)− c is strictly increasing in θ, while QN(θ, σθˆ′) = 0 for all θ. Hence, QY (θ, σθˆ′) >
(<)c if θ > (<)θˆ′, that is, any θ has no incentive to deviate.
8.6. Proof of Proposition 2
First, to show (i), suppose the incumbent uses a cutoff strategy σθˆ. Let s(α
∗, σθˆ; v0) be s
such that ˆ
θ>θˆ
v(α∗, θ, ω)µ(θ|Y, s;σθˆ)dθ = v0. (A4)
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of such a cutoff signal s. When the challenger gets
more popular, the spending level has to be lower to impress the voter. Thus, s(α∗, σθˆ; v
′
0) <
s(α∗, σθˆ; v0) if v
′
0 > v0. Thus, F (s(α∗, σθˆ; v
′
0)|θˆ) < F (s(α∗, σθˆ; v0)|θˆ) for any θˆ ∈ (0, 1). Now
let θˆv0 and θˆv′0 be the equilibrium cutoffs given v0 and v
′
0 respectively. That is, these are
the solutions of F (s(α∗, σθˆ; v0)|θˆ) = c and F (s(α∗, σθˆ′ ; v′0)|θˆ) = c respectively. Then, since
F (s(α∗, σθˆ; v0)|θˆ) and F (s(α∗, σθˆ; v′0)|θˆ) are both increasing in θˆ, we obtain θˆv0 < θˆv′0 .
Turning to (ii), to compare the median voter’s expected payoffs under v0 and v′0, consider
the following three cases.
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Case 1: The incumbent’s type is θ < θˆv0 .
By the definition of the cutoff strategy, the incumbent’s policy choice is a = N under
both v0 and v′0. From Lemma 4, α∗θˆv0 + (1−α∗)ω0 < v0 and α∗θˆv′0 + (1−α∗)ω0 < v′0. Thus,
the voter always chooses the challenger if she observes the policy choice of a = N . Then,
the voter’s payoff is higher under v′0.
Case 2: The incumbent’s type is θ ∈ (θˆv0 , θˆv′0).
Given the cutoff strategy, the incumbent’s policy choice is a = N under v′0 and the voter
chooses the challenger as we explained earlier. Thus, the voter’s payoff is v′0 under v′0. On
the other hand, by the definition of the cutoff strategy, the policy choice is a = Y under
v0. Then, the voter’s decision depends on the realization of s. If the voter chooses the
incumbent, the payoff is α∗θ + (1 − α∗)ω0 which is strictly lower than v′0 since θ < θˆv′0 and
α∗θˆv′0 + (1− α∗)ω0 < v′0 from Lemma 4. If the voter chooses the challenger, the payoff is v0
which is also lower than v′0. Thus, the voter’s payoff is higher under v′0 if the incumbent’s
type is θ ∈ (θˆv0 , θˆv′0)
Case 3: The incumbent’s type is θ > θˆv′0 .
Given the strategy, the policy choice is a = Y under both v0 and v′0. Let s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0)
be the voter’s optimal cutoff signal under v0 which is the solution of the following equation
with respect to s: ˆ
θ>θˆv0
v(α∗, θ, ω)µ(θ|Y, s;σθˆv0 )dθ = v0. (A5)
Note that Assumption 1 guarantees a unique interior solution of the above equation. Now
consider the following hypothetical situation: the voter uses the cutoff signal s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0)
under both v0 and v′0. That is, the voter best-responses to (Y, s) under v0 but it is suboptimal
under v′0. Then, if s > s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0) and the voter chooses the challenger, the voter’s payoff is
v′0 under v′0 and v0 under v0. Thus, the voter’s payoff is higher under v′0. On the other hand, if
s ≤ s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0) and the voter chooses the incumbent, the voter’s payoff is α
∗θ+(1−α∗)ω0
under both v0 and v′0. Then, since the probability of having s > s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0) is always
positive in the informative equilibrium, the voter’s expected payoff from the response with
cutoff signal s(α∗, σθˆv0 ; v0) conditional on θ is higher under v
′
0 if θ > θˆv′0 . Now, suppose the
voter also best-responses under v′0 instead of the suboptimal response, that is, selecting the
incumbent if and only if s ≤ s(α∗, σθˆv′0 ; v
′
0). Since this is the best response, this improves the
voter’s payoff under v′0. Thus, in equilibrium, the voter’s expected payoff under v′0 has to be
higher than under v0 if θ > θˆv′0 .
Since we showed that the voter’s expected payoff is higher under v′0 for any θ, the voter’s
expected payoff is higher under v′0.
8.7. Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the N-pooling equilibrium. Let θˆ∗ be the cutoff type in the informative equilibrium.
We claim that if voters believe that the set of types who could deviate to Y is (θˆ∗, 1], this is a
credible updating rule. Observe that if
´
θ
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ < v(α∗, θ0, ω0), the incumbent’s
payoff in the N-pooling equilibrium is 0. On the other hand, by Lemma 2, we know that
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the expected payoff from N in the cutoff equilibrium is also 0. On the other hand, from
the property of θˆ∗ and Assumption 1, the expected payoff from Y if the voter believes that
θ > θˆ∗ is strictly positive. Hence, if the voter believes that θ ∈ (θˆ∗, 1] given Y , the incumbent
has incentive to choose Y if and only if θ ∈ (θˆ∗, 1]. That is, the N-pooling is not a PSE.
8.8. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the Y-pooling equilibrium. In this equilibrium, type θ incumbent’s expected payoff
is F (s(α, σp)|θ)− c. Suppose that voters believe that the incumbent’s type is in Θ when he
deviates to N. Then, if
´
v(α∗, θ, ω)fθ(θ)dθ > v(α∗, θ0, ω0), the incumbent’s expected payoff
is strictly higher for all types since the probability of re-election is 1, while there is no cost
from N. Then, if T = Θ, it is profitable for all types to deviate. That is, the updating rule
with T = Θ is credible. Finally, since the expected payoff in the N-pooling equilibrium is
the highest possible payoff, this is obviously a PSE. Then, from Corollary 2, the N-pooling
is the only PSE if ρ is sufficiently small.
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